Cognition, movement and morality by Zentall, Thomas R.
Zentall, Thomas R. (2020) Cognition, movement and morality. Animal Sentience 
29(11) 
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1594 
This article has appeared in the journal Animal Sentience, 
a peer-reviewed journal on animal cognition and feeling. It 
has been made open access, free for all, by WellBeing 
International and deposited in the WBI Studies 
Repository. For more information, please contact 
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org. 
Animal Sentience 2020.340:  Zentall on Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds 
 
 1 
Cognition, movement and morality 
Commentary on Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds  
 
 
Thomas R. Zentall 
Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky 
 
Abstract: Each of the criteria for determining which should be given moral standing has its 
shortcomings. The criterion of cognitive is especially weak. That research on comparative cognition 
may default to the simplest account is not grounds for abandoning this scientific practice. Instead, 
we should dissociate scientific evidence of cognitive ability from moral obligation. In addition to 
the criteria suggested by Mikhalevich & Powell for including species in welfare protections, I would 
suggest a very old one — the ability to physically move. 
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We use several measures to make distinctions among species and to decide which ones we should 
care about and even protect. The cognitive ability of many vertebrates has often been 
emphasized, but there is also growing evidence of remarkable intelligence in bees (Chittka & 
Thomson 2001; von Frisch 1967). Macphail (1987) suggested that (although many comparative 
cognitive psychologists such as Shettleworth, 1998, might disagree) most species differences in 
cognitive abilities can be explained by contextual differences — differences in sensory ability, 
response means, naturally occurring behavior, and motivation. 
 
The default criterion for comparative cognition.  Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) suggest 
that in evaluating behavioral evidence for cognitive behavior, we should not use the criterion used 
by many comparative cognitive researchers — the simplest, least cognitively sophisticated 
explanation (otherwise known as Morgan’s Canon 1894) — because it will tend to result in false 
negative biases.  
As a comparative cognition researcher, I feel that it is important to distinguish between 
the demonstrated cognitive abilities of a species and the degree that we should be interested in 
its welfare. After all, we keep and often dote on animal pets, whether they are intelligent or not. 
To judge cognition in terms of the simplest underlying mechanism is not only good science; it also 
forces researchers to design experiments that challenge these simpler accounts. For example, 
pigeons learning to match-to-sample (if a sample stimulus is red, choose the red comparison 
stimulus; if a sample stimulus is green, choose the green comparison stimulus) may be taken as 
evidence that pigeons have the concept of sameness. But before coming to such a conclusion, 
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one must rule out a simpler account — that the pigeon has learned two stimulus response chains 
(Skinner, 1950). By carefully designing experiments that control for such simpler learning, one can 
provide more convincing evidence for having the concept of sameness after all (e.g., Zentall & 
Hogan, 1976; Zentall, Andrews, & Case, 2018). The alternative to this more challenging route is to 
interpret the behavior of other animals uncritically in terms of our own behavior and often the 
emotions that are presumed to underlie our behavior, such as guilt, jealousy, or empathy (cf. Cook 
et al., 2018). For example, dogs that have “misbehaved” are said to look guilty when the behavior 
is discovered by their owner. But critically designed experiments suggest that the expectation of 
punishment based on their owner’s demeanor, independent of their own previous behavior, is a 
more likely cause (e.g., Horowitz, 2009). 
The mistake is to conflate research on cognitive performance (a scientific pursuit) with 
whether other species are worthy of our concern. We can conduct rigorous research on the 
cognitive performance of a species while controlling for alternative accounts. Regardless of our 
conclusions — e.g., that the animal being studied has a particular ability or that we are still 
uncertain — we can still believe the animal is worthy of our caring.  
 
Other factors.  M&P note that the ability to feel pain might be a useful way to determine which 
animals we should care about. But we really do not have a good way to measure the feeling of 
pain in animals. Even in humans we generally rely on what they tell us about their pain: doctors 
ask us to indicate on a 10-point scale how much pain we feel.  
As it turns out, making a cognitive distinction between vertebrates and invertebrates is a 
convenience of categorization. The fact that cephalopod mollusks are sometimes given the status 
of ‘honorary vertebrates’ allows the distinction to be maintained despite the obvious exceptions. 
Because the distinction very roughly correlates with differences in measures of intelligence, it has 
been taken as evidence that invertebrates occupy a lower rung in the scala naturae.  However, 
any criterion we use to distinguish the animals that we should and should not care for will have 
its flaws.  
The fact that some arthropods carry disease and others cause us pain may have caused us 
to evolve a tendency to feel disgust or fear toward them, and that makes it easy for us to separate 
them from vertebrates. We should be smart enough to recognize, however, not only that many 
of those species serve us very well, but that even those that do not serve us directly, often provide 
food for species that we do value (such as insect-eating birds). 
We can make conjectures about whether an animal feels pain by identifying brain systems 
similar to our own, but that assumes that similar systems have similar functions. Although bird 
brains are quite different from mammalian brains, they manage to demonstrate remarkable 
cognitive skills with virtually no cortex (e.g., Weir, Chappell, & Kacelnik, 2002; Pepperberg, 1999). 
It apparently does not take a large brain to generate the remarkable navigational skills of dessert 
ants (Collett, Collett, & Wehner, 1999), or the communication skills of bees (von Frisch, 1967).  
 M&P’s excellent analysis of the various measures that might be used to identify 
characteristics of species warranting our moral concern leaves us with the conclusion that no 
single measure can help us draw a sharp distinction. I appreciate M&P’s suggestion that as we 
show that some invertebrates demonstrate the cognition and sentience of many vertebrates, 
ethicists and policy makers should consider extending protections to invertebrates as well. 
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An old criterion to warrant welfare consideration.  I would add one more distinction to those 
that M&P discuss. If sentience is important and the ability to feel pain should influence how we 
treat other species (as suggested by Ibn Sēnā, an 11th century Persian philosopher) then an 
indirect measure of the ability to feel pain may be an animal’s ability to physically remove itself 
from the source of the pain (Janssens, 1991). Although it is not obvious that an animal able to 
move must feel pain, and mobility may not be the only way for an animal to alleviate pain, it 
would certainly place most arthropods and other invertebrates in the same category as 
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